Autore Topic: [inglese] La storia della TSR  (Letto 5726 volte)

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[inglese] La storia della TSR
« il: 2010-05-31 04:11:05 »
Stanotte, seguendo un link, ho scoperto che il vecchio sito di Gary Gygax non esiste più, e con esso la FAQ che raccontava la sua versione della storia della proprietà di D&D e della TSR. Visto che in rete si continuano a dire boiate su questi argomenti (tipo che D&D era un gioco indie - non è vero, Gygax non ha mai avuto il controllo totale della ditta - o che la TSR negli anni 80 andava benissimo - certo, ha rischiato di fallire già nel 1985...) ho pensato fosse il caso di cercarla con la Wayback machine e salvarla qui, almeno per le parti interessanti (per la versione complrta, il link che ho trovato tramite la wayback machine è http://web.archive.org/web/20020802014646/www.gygax.com/gygaxfaq.html
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[size=14]AD&D and My Leaving TSR[/size]
Many people are under the mistaken impression that Gary Gygax owned the majority interest in TSR. This is not the case, and here is the chronology that brought a definite minority shareholder status for Gary:

1973: Gary and Don Kaye form Tactical Studies Rules, an equal partnership.

1974: Brian Blume is admitted as an equal (1/3) partner.

1976: Don dies of a heart attack in January. His wife is impossible to deal with. TSR Hobbies Inc. is formed, and this corporation buys out Don's widow. At this point, Gary controls the corporation with c. 60% of the shares. Later on, because of extreme cash shortages, having spent a lot to buy out Mrs. Kaye, shares of TSR are sold to Brian and his father, Melvin. By the fall, Gary's interest in the corporation is down to about 35%, and thereafter it dropped to around 30%.

Simply put, he didn't have the money to keep up with the share purchases. Yes, he placed his own interests below those of the corporation.

1985: Gary exercises an option, and with what amounted to a handful of shares voted by other family members, he had a c. 50.1% majority. Later, when Brian Blume exercised an option he held, so as to sell those shares, and the others he and his brother Kevin held, to Lorraine Williams, Gary was again a minority shareholder.

In this same year he sued to prevent the transfer of Blume-owned shares, arguing that a corporate buy-sell agreement prevented the sale to Williams. The local judge rules otherwise.

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[size=14]What Happened to Gygax - TSR?[/size]

The reader is referred also to the FAQ regarding stock ownership in TSR, as it explains a good deal of what happened.

Gary was President of TSR Hobbies, Inc. when it was formed in 1976. In fiscal 1981 the company made c. $16.5 million dollars income, with c. $4.25 pre-tax profit. At this time, corporate long-term debt was about equal to an average month's receipts. Gygax did not believe in borrowing money except for short-term needs, for projects that could not otherwise be produced, but that would in a relatively brief time generate sufficient sales to repay any loan needed to get them to market.

The board of directors of TSR then consisted of Gary, Brian Blume, and Kevin Blume. The latter two voted about 60% of the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation, compared to Gary's c. 30%.

The Board decided to reorganize the company. Gary would be president, but "beneath" him were two other presidents: Brian Blume was "President of Creative" at TSR, and Kevin Blume was "President of Operations". In theory, they reported to and took direction from Gary. In reality, being two-thirds of the board, the Blumes ran TSR and Gary was boxed out.

From that point on, Gary never ran the company, and had to fight for anything he thought was in the best interests of TSR. Gary wanted to keep the best quality in binding and products in general. He believed that authors of works should have their names on the works. He believed that some royalty should be paid to creative employees. He thought that all employees of TSR should be able to buy shares of stock and participate in ownership.

All of these ideas were antithetical to the Blumes, it seems. Each of these instituted practices were done away with systematically. with product quality being the main target. Brian Blume stated publicly that he wanted "obscene profits at federally insured safety".

In 1983 Gary was instructed by the board to go out to California and set up TSR Entertainment Corp., a company owned by the Exempt Profit Sharing Plan of TSR. He did so, changing the name of the operation to Dungeons & Dragons Entertainment Corp. after discovering that the entertainment business community there would not do business with TSR.

DDEC had the D&D Cartoon Show and several other fledgling projects underway. It was responsible for the closing of the deal whereby Speilberg licensed the name, AMAZING STORIES, from TSR.

Gary returned to Lake Geneva in the winter of 1984 because TSR was in debt and the bank was threatening to force it into bankruptcy. Associates of his called to inform him that Kevin Blume was shopping the company on the street, as is said, out in New York City.

By this time the Blumes had forced him to accept three "outside" directors on the board. The Blumes had embraced the precepts of the now-defunct American Management Association. It was inept at promulgating even manufacturing ideals, in Gary's opinion.

These three petty businessmen, two executives and a lawyer, were absolutely ignorant of the gaming business, and under their direction, and with the Blumes leading the way, TSR had accumulated $1,5 million debt that they couldn't figure out how to pay. amongst their ideas were the dropping of the RPGA and the sale of DRAGON Magazine. After some thought, Gygax presented a long letter to the entire board, outlining the mismanagement of TSR by Kevin Blume, and demanding his resignation and replacement. The board voted four to two, the Blumes abstaining, to remove Kevin and put in place a pro-tem president, one Richard Koenigs. With direction form Gary and other executives of the company, some 90 relatives of the Blumes were removed from the payroll, various corporate owned and leased cars, scores of them, were gotten rid of, unused system office furniture owned and leased was likewise sold or returned, and two major releases were rushed into print--UNEARTHED ARCANA and ORIENTAL ADVENTURES. By April 1985, the corner had been turned, and the American National Bank was no longer glowering and considering pulling the loan plug, so to speak.

It must be noted that the bank was not only not helpful, they were quite obstructive in getting the corporation back on its feet, in Gary's opinion. Prior to the April date, Gygax exercised an option he held, putting many thousands of dollars into the plus side of the corporate ledger, and also assuming a bare majority control thus. He than took the office of the presidency, and told the three "outside" directors that their days were numbered. They had,, he said, "pontificated business" while the company went to near ruin.

Not surprisingly, these three sterling individuals were aligned with Williams and the Blumes in the dispute over whether or not the latter could sell their shares, and an additional 700 they secretly purchased by option exercise. to thus allow Lorraine Williams majority control of TSR.

 Learning of the scheme, Gygax acquired attorneys and managed to have a temporary injunction granted so as to prevent the share transfer. However, in late 1985 the county judge, who seemed unable to recognize what constituted a contract, as Gary says, decided in favor of the defendants. At this juncture Gygax started an appeal, but was both hard pressed for funds and heartily sick and tired of the mess. Just before the end of the year, Gygax agreed to sell his shares and other interests to TSR, and left the corporation in the hands of Williams.

The capacity of Lorraine Williams to manage a game company is no longer in question. With a debt load of perhaps $30 million dollars or more, and facing bankruptcy soon, she sold out to Wizards of the Coast in 1997. That is surely a step in the right direction for TSR. Gary believes. Williams despised gamers, and she stated in his presence that they were not her "social equals". She also claimed she was going to show the game industry how business should be conducted. Some lesson.

Clearly, Wizards of the Coast is not of that ilk, runs an excellent operation, and under their direction TSR fans should see a major improvement.

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[size=14]Dangerous Journeys / Mythus[/size]

This multi-genre game system and the first game within it, the MYTHUS FRPG, were conceived in 1986, when New Infinities was in operation.

Gary began writing a horror-based RPG then, and his son, Luke was the first play-tester. After NIPI went down the tubes, he collaborated with Mike McCulley. Mike was co-author of the whole underlying game system, although he hasn't ever gotten proper credit, because of later events.

When large computer corporations were involved via the offices of two agents then representing the game system, it was decided that fantasy rather than horror must be the initial release in the DJ line.

Dave Newton was contracted by Trigee to co-write the now-rush MYTHUS FRPG. So work began immediately, and Game Designers' Workshop was signed up as publisher of the paper side of the game.

The rest is history that's pretty well known. TSR sued claiming all sorts of things, but going mainly on copyright infringement. The suit was settled. TSR paid certain considerable sums of money (in addition to the c. $2 million they had tossed to their lawyers to suppress the game), and they acquired DJ and the ancillary things such as JOURNEYS and MYTHIC MASTERS Magazines.

As of June 1997, there is no indication that DJ will ever be revived, although there is considerable following, and also some "expansion" of the system with enthusiast-generated additions and rules for personal use by active groups so as to be able to continue play in other genres, Gary is told.

To the best of his knowledge and belief, the suit was not the proximate cause of the eventual demise of GDW. In fact, under the settlement, they paid none of the legal fees for defense against TSR's claims, and TSR purchased remaining inventory from GDW.
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[inglese] La storia della TSR
« Risposta #1 il: 2010-05-31 04:16:02 »
E' interessante confrontare i racconti precedenti sulla TSR degli anni 70-80 con questa cronaca scritta da Ryan Dancey riguardo alla sua esplorazione dei documenti della TSR negli anni 90...
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In the winter of 1997, I traveled to Lake Geneva Wisconsin on a secret mission. In the late fall, rumors of TSR's impending bankruptcy had created an opportunity to made a bold gamble that the business could be saved by an infusion of capital or an acquisition with a larger partner. After a hasty series of phone calls and late night strategy sessions, I found myself standing in the snow outside of 201 Sheridan Springs Road staring at a building bearing a sign that said "TSR, Incorporated".

Inside the building, I found a dead company.

In the halls that had produced the stuff of my childhood fantasies, and had fired my imagination and become unalterably intertwined with my own sense of self, I found echoes, empty desks, and the terrible depression of lost purpose.

The life story of a tree can be read by a careful examination of its rings. The life story of a corporation can be read by a careful examination of its financial records and corporate minutes.

I was granted unprecedented access to those records. I read the TSR corporate log book from the first page penned in haste by Gary Gygax to the most recent terse minutes dictated to a lawyer with no connection to hobby gaming. I was able to trace the meteoric rise of D&D as a business, the terrible failure to control costs that eventually allowed a total outsider to take control away from the founders, the slow and steady progress to rebuild the financial solvency of the company, and the sudden and dramatic failure of that business model. I read the euphoric copyright filings for the books of my lost summers: "Player's Handbook", "Fiend Folio", "Oriental Adventures". I read the contract between Gary and TSR where Gary was severed from contact with the company he had founded and the business he had nurtured and grown. I saw the clause where Gary, forced to the wall by ruthless legal tactics was reduced to insisting to the right to use his own name in future publishing endeavors, and to take and keep control of his personal D&D characters. I read the smudged photocopies produced by the original Dragonlance Team, a group of people who believed in a new idea for gaming that told a story across many different types of products. I saw concept artwork evolve from lizard men with armor to unmistakable draconians. I read Tracy Hickman's one page synopsis of the Dragonlance Story. I held the contract between Tracy and Margaret for the publication of the three Chronicles novels. I read the contract between Ed Greenwood and TSR to buy his own personal game world and transform it into the most developed game setting in history - the most detailed and explored fantasy world ever created.

And I read the details of the Random House distribution agreement; an agreement that TSR had used to support a failing business and hide the fact that TSR was rotten at the core. I read the entangling bank agreements that divided the copyright interests of the company as security against default, and realized that the desperate arrangements made to shore up the company's poor financial picture had so contaminated those rights that it might not be possible to extract Dungeons & Dragons from the clutches of lawyers and bankers and courts for years upon end. I read the severance agreements between the company and departed executives which paid them extraordinary sums for their silence. I noted the clauses, provisions, amendments and agreements that were piling up more debt by the hour in the form of interest charges, fees and penalties. I realized that the money paid in good faith by publishers and attendees for GenCon booths and entrance fees had been squandered and that the show itself could not be funded. I discovered that the cost of the products that company was making in many cases exceeded the price the company was receiving for selling those products. I toured a warehouse packed from floor to 50 foot ceiling with products valued as though they would soon be sold to a distributor with production stamps stretching back to the late 1980s. I was 10 pages in to a thick green bar report of inventory, calculating the true value of the material in that warehouse when I realized that my last 100 entries had all been "$0"'s.

I met staff members who were determined to continue to work, despite the knowledge that they might not get paid, might not even be able to get in to the building each day. I saw people who were working on the same manuscripts they'd been working on six months earlier, never knowing if they'd actually be able to produce the fruits of their labor. In the eyes of those people (many of whom I have come to know as friends and co workers), I saw defeat, desperation, and the certain knowledge that somehow, in some way, they had failed. The force of the human, personal pain in that building was nearly overwhelming - on several occasions I had to retreat to a bathroom to sit and compose myself so that my own tears would not further trouble those already tortured souls.

I ran hundreds of spreadsheets, determined to figure out what had to be done to save the company. I was convinced that if I could just move enough money from column A to column B, that everything would be ok. Surely, a company with such powerful brands and such a legacy of success could not simply cease to exist due to a few errors of judgment and a poor strategic plan?

I made several trips to TSR during the frenzied days of negotiation that resulted in the acquisition of the company by Wizards of the Coast. When I returned home from my first trip, I retreated to my home office; a place filled with bookshelves stacked with Dungeons & Dragons products. From the earliest games to the most recent campaign setting supplements - I owned, had read, and loved those products with a passion and intensity that I devoted to little else in my life. And I knew, despite my best efforts to tell myself otherwise, that the disaster I kept going back to in Wisconsin was the result of the products on those shelves.

When Peter put me in charge of the tabletop RPG business in 1998, he gave me one commission: Find out what went wrong, fix the business, save D&D. Vince also gave me a business condition that was easy to understand and quite direct. "God damnit, Dancey", he thundered at me from across the conference table: "Don't lose any more money!"

That became my core motivation. Save D&D. Don't lose money. Figure out what went wrong. Fix the problem.

(continua)
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[inglese] La storia della TSR
« Risposta #2 il: 2010-05-31 04:16:39 »
(continua dal post precedente)

Back into those financials I went. I walked again the long threads of decisions made by managers long gone; there are few roadmarks to tell us what was done and why in the years TSR did things like buy a needlepoint distributorship, or establish a west coast office at King Vedor's mansion. Why had a moderate success in collectable dice triggered a million unit order? Why did I still have stacks and stacks of 1st edition rulebooks in the warehouse? Why did TSR create not once, not twice, but nearly a dozen times a variation on the same, Tolkien inspired, eurocentric fantasy theme? Why had it constantly tried to create different games, poured money into marketing those games, only to realize that nobody was buying those games? Why, when it was so desperate for cash, had it invested in a million dollar license for content used by less than 10% of the marketplace? Why had a successful game line like Dragonlance been forcibly uprooted from its natural home in the D&D game and transplanted to a foreign and untested new game system? Why had the company funded the development of a science fiction game modeled on D&D - then not used the D&D game rules?

In all my research into TSR's business, across all the ledgers, notebooks, computer files, and other sources of data, there was one thing I never found - one gaping hole in the mass of data we had available.

No customer profiling information. No feedback. No surveys. No "voice of the customer". TSR, it seems, knew nothing about the people who kept it alive. The management of the company made decisions based on instinct and gut feelings; not data. They didn't know how to listen - as an institution, listening to customers was considered something that other companies had to do - TSR lead, everyone else followed.

In today's hypercompetitive market, that's an impossible mentality. At Wizards of the Coast, we pay close attention to the voice of the customer. We ask questions. We listen. We react. So, we spent a whole lot of time and money on a variety of surveys and studies to learn about the people who play role playing games. And, at every turn, we learned things that were not only surprising, they flew in the face of all the conventional wisdom we'd absorbed through years of professional game publishing.

We heard some things that are very, very hard for a company to hear. We heard that our customers felt like we didn't trust them. We heard that we produced material they felt was substandard, irrelevant, and broken. We heard that our stories were boring or out of date, or simply uninteresting. We heard the people felt that >we< were irrelevant.

I know now what killed TSR. It wasn't trading card games. It wasn't Dragon Dice. It wasn't the success of other companies. It was a near total inability to listen to its customers, hear what they were saying, and make changes to make those customers happy. TSR died because it was deaf.

Amazingly, despite all those problems, and despite years of neglect, the D&D game itself remained, at the core, a viable business. Damaged; certainly. Ailing; certainly. But savable? Absolutely.

Our customers were telling us that 2e was too restrictive, limited their creativity, and wasn't "fun to play'? We can fix that. We can update the core rules to enable the expression of that creativity. We can demonstrate a commitment to supporting >your< stories. >Your< worlds. And we can make the game fun again.

Our customers were telling us that we produced too many products, and that the stuff we produced was of inferior quality? We can fix that. We can cut back on the number of products we release, and work hard to make sure that each and every book we publish is useful, interesting, and of high quality.

Our customers were telling us that we spent too much time on our own worlds, and not enough time on theirs? Ok - we can fix that. We can re-orient the business towards tools, towards examples, towards universal systems and rules that aren't dependent on owning a thousand dollars of unnecessary materials first.

Our customers were telling us that they prefer playing D&D nearly 2:1 over the next most popular game option? That's an important point of distinction. We can leverage that desire to help get them more people to play >with< by reducing the barriers to compatibility between the material we produce, and the material created by other companies.

Our customers told us they wanted a better support organization? We can pour money and resources into the RPGA and get it growing and supporting players like never before in the club's history. (10,000 paid members and rising, nearly 50,000 unpaid members - numbers currently skyrocketing).

Our customers were telling us that they want to create and distribute content based on our game? Fine - we can accommodate that interest and desire in a way that keeps both our customers and our lawyers happy.

Are we still listening? Yes, we absolutely are. If we hear you asking us for something we're not delivering, we'll deliver it. But we're not going to cater to the specific and unique needs of a minority if doing so will cause hardship to the majority. We're going to try and be responsible shepards of the D&D business, and that means saying "no" to things that we have shown to be damaging to the business and that aren't wanted or needed by most of our customers.

We listened when the customers told us that Alternity wasn't what they wanted in a science fiction game. We listened when customers told us that they didn't want the confusing, jargon filled world of Planescape. We listened when people told us that the Ravenloft concept was overshadowed by the products of a competitor. We listened to customers who told us that they want core materials, not world materials. That they buy DUNGEON magazine every two months at a rate twice that of our best selling stand-alone adventures.

We're not telling anyone what game to play. We are telling the market that we're going to actively encourage our players to stand up and demand that they be listened to, and that they become the center of the gaming industry - rather than the current publisher-centric model. Through the RPGA, the Open Gaming movement, the pages of Dragon Magazine, and all other venues available, we want to empower our customers to do what >they< want, to force us and our competitors to bend to >their< will, to make the products >they< want made.

I want to be judged on results, not rhetoric. I want to look back at my time at the helm of this business and feel that things got better, not worse. I want to know that my team made certain that the mistakes of the past wouldn't be the mistakes of the future. I want to know that we figured out what went wrong. That we fixed it. That we saved D&D. And that god damnit, we didn't lose money.

Thank you for listening,

Sincerely,

Ryan S. Dancey
VP, Wizards of the Coast
Brand Manager, Dungeons & Dragons
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« Risposta #3 il: 2010-05-31 04:56:32 »
OK, finito. Apro il thread a commenti, ma se volete prendere solo spunto da questi dati per parlare di qualcosa di specifico, è meglio se aprite un thread separato.

La cosa impressionante, leggendo questi racconti, è il vedere come la TSR, praticamente dal nulla, senza pubblicità iniziale, in sette anni (1974-1981) diventa una ditta da 16 milioni di dollari di fatturato (dell'epoca - e la guida del giocatore costava 15 dollari), e senza pubblicare praticamente nulla a parte i manuali base, per gli standard attuali!

Infatti, facciamo un po' di conti... (tralascio per semplicità i giochi diversi da D&D che comunque non hanno mai fatto una lira)
1974- la scatola originale con i tre booklet
1975 - i 4 supplementi alla scatola originale (piccoli spillati economici da pochi dollari con una sessantina di pagine di piccolo formato)
1977- esce la "basic Edition" di Holmes (il blue book) e il primo volume di AD&D, il monster manual
1978 - AD&D player handbook, ed esce il PRIMO modulo avventura "G1: Steading of the Hill Giant Chief" (sì, esce dopo AD&D, la TSR non pubblicò avventure fino al 1978)
1979 - AD&D DM's Guide
1980 - AD&D Deities and Demigods
1981 -  D&D Basic / Expert di Mondway/Cook e il Fiend Folio.

E' una produzione da piccolo editore.  Ho provato a fare un po' di conti con i moduli avventura e dal 1978 al 1981 (4 anni) ne sono usciti credo meno di 30 (escludendo le ristampe) e quasi tutti concentrati nel 1980-81. E sono tutti dungeon con un po' di storia attorno, che puoi tranquillamente fare a meno di comprare.

Solo il gioco base, con successive edizioni.  Dov'è il "supplement threadmill"? Dov'è la dominanza della TSR dei negozi, con produzione di decine e decine di titoli ogni anno, supplementi "imperdibili" e i manuali collezionabili?

Quelli iniziano ad arrivare dopo (anche se nel 1980-81 già si vedono i segni. Se avessi fermato l'analisi nel 1979 i numeri sarebbero stati ancora più impressionanti).

Nel 1985, questa stessa ditta sta andando a fallire. Certo, c'è una gestione fallimentare. Che, fra le tante cose fallimentari, ha deciso, appunto, di moltiplicare la produzione di supplementi.

Nel 1985 si salva. Ma da lì al 1997 fa in tempo ad accumulare un debito stratosferico che maschera con trucchi contabili e tanta hype.

E questo, con un gioco che ancora vendeva un sacco...

Il "mito della pubblicazione periodica" quindi non ha mai funzionato, nemmeno per D&D. E' veramente un fallimento totale. Un Carretto delle Mele Nuclearizzato
« Ultima modifica: 2010-05-31 15:03:22 da Moreno Roncucci »
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[inglese] La storia della TSR
« Risposta #4 il: 2010-05-31 12:27:53 »
Sembra un'allegoria della storia economica e finanziaria d'Occidente...

Mattia Bulgarelli

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[inglese] La storia della TSR
« Risposta #5 il: 2010-05-31 16:13:13 »
Citazione
[cite]Autore: Moreno Roncucci[/cite]I was 10 pages in to a thick green bar report of inventory, calculating the true value of the material in that warehouse when I realized that my last 100 entries had all been "$0"'s.

Tradotto per chi non avesse la minima esperienza di bilanci e contabilità (non che io sia una cima, eh): "nessuna speranza di farci un soldo, allo stato attuale del mercato".

Citazione
[cite]Autore: Moreno Roncucci[/cite]Why, when it was so desperate for cash, had it invested in a million dollar license for content used by less than 10% of the marketplace? Why had a successful game line like Dragonlance been forcibly uprooted from its natural home in the D&D game and transplanted to a foreign and untested new game system?

A cosa fa riferimento in questi due punti?

Citazione
[cite]Autore: Jonni[/cite][p]Sembra un'allegoria della storia economica e finanziaria d'Occidente...[/p]

???
Co-creatore di Dilemma! - Ninja tra i pirati a INC 2010 - Padre del motto "Basta Chiedere™!"

Renato Ramonda

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« Risposta #6 il: 2010-05-31 17:00:20 »
Il commento su Dragonlance e' sul Dragonlance Saga System (o come si chiamava) che fece un discreto tonfo.

[inglese] La storia della TSR
« Risposta #7 il: 2010-05-31 18:22:23 »
Citazione
[cite]Autore: renatoram[/cite][p]Il commento su Dragonlance e' sul Dragonlance Saga System (o come si chiamava) che fece un discreto tonfo.[/p]


IO ce l'ho.
E non posso che essere d'accordo. O meglio... non era una brutta idea, peccato che fosse reso, sia a livello di testo sia graficamente, con la stessa passione e fighicità (lol) della Gazzetta Ufficiale.

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[inglese] La storia della TSR
« Risposta #8 il: 2010-06-02 23:11:51 »
Altri dati, dall'articolo di Gary Gygax sui 25 anni di storia della TSR pubblicato sull'annual 2000 di Dragon Magazine.

Gygax descrive (pagina 11) un aumento esponenziale regolare del fatturato:  $500.000 nel 1977, 1 milione di dollari nel 1978, 2 milioni nel 1979, 4 milioni nel 1980... e poi, nel 1981, il fatturato quadruplica!  Perchè? Perchè iniziano le polemiche contro D&D. Viene accusato di essere satanista. Di aver provocato suicidi. Di essere dannoso per i bambini. Se ne parla (molto male) in TV.

Notare che la "vulgata ufficiale" da anni dice che quegli attacchi provocarono notevoli danni a D&D. E invece in questo articolo abbiamo Gygax che racconta, dopo quasi vent'anni, che il fatturato QUADRUPLICO' in seguito a quegli attacchi, arrivando alla cifra di 16 milioni di dollari citata prima. E l'aumento avrebbe potuto essere anche maggiore: la TSR non riusciva a stampare abbastanza copie per soddisfare la richiesta, i volumi erano difficili da trovare nei negozi. E proprio nei luoghi dove le comunità religiose avevano più attaccato il gioco, come nell'Utah, c'era la maggiore richiesta...

Dopo questo boom nel 1981, la crescita rallenta: 24 milioni di dollari nel 1982, e 32 milioni nel 1983 (e notare che in questi anni la macchina di produzione dei moduli entra a pieno regime, anche se sono ancora solo moduli avventura)

Nell'articolo Gygax dice che a quel punto, convinto che il gioco avesse raggiunto il suo apice di vendite nella sua forma attuale, propone nel 1984 una nuova edizione più accessibile ad un pubblico più vasto. Si prende quindi la paternità dell'idea della seconda edizione, anche se poi dice che che non poté seguirla in alcun modo e venne completamente diversa da come l'avrebbe voluta (visto che Gygax non è nuovo a prendersi il merito di cose non sue, queste affermazioni vanno sempre prese con beneficio d'inventario...)

Il 1984 è l'ano in cui la compagnia inizia a trovarsi in difficoltà finanziare - su cui Gygax glissa accennandovi solamente en passant - che peggioreranno nel 1985 facendo rischiare la bancarotta...

Quindi, riepilogando... gli attacchi dei fondamentalisti hanno dato un boost notevole alle vendite di D&D, quasi raddoppiandole rispetto a previsioni già ottimistiche.  A portare quasi alla bancarotta la TSR subito dopo è stato il contare su una crescita continua di quel tipo, e la politica editoriale seguita (nonché gli sprechi)

Se trovo altri dati li posto...
« Ultima modifica: 2010-06-02 23:13:34 da Moreno Roncucci »
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Rafu

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« Risposta #9 il: 2010-06-02 23:17:42 »
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[cite]Autore: Moreno Roncucci[/cite]gli attacchi dei fondamentalisti hanno dato un boost notevole alle vendite di D&D, quasi raddoppiandole rispetto a previsioni già ottimistiche.

Pensandoci bene, non è affatto stupefacente. Si tratta, anzi, del pattern più naturale e cui abbiamo assistito più volte per mille cose.

adam

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« Risposta #10 il: 2010-06-02 23:20:39 »
tipo tutto l'astio contro i giochi gay che ha avuto come unico effetto il farli conoscere in giro ancora di più?
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« Risposta #11 il: 2010-06-02 23:32:40 »
Moreno, perdonami, ma sbaglio o dopo AD&D 1a edizione che era un po' un disastro a livello di regole e bilanciamento, Gygax insoddisfatto decise di produrre/scrivere/mettere la sua firma (Sembieda e Gygax, due luminari del latrocinio del lavoro altrui, lol) sul supplemento Unearthed Arcana e che, avendo questo supplemento ancora di più incasinato le regole, spinse la TSR (o Gygax, come gli piace gloriarsi) al decidere, fra polemiche e insoddisfazioni nelle varie fazioni dei fan, di sviluppare la 2a edizione di AD&D?

Ricordo una situazione del genere, più o meno...

D'altronde D&D ebbe pure un boost incredibile all'inizio degli anni '80 quando uscì quella PORCATA di film con Tom Hanks chiamato Mazes and Monsters tratto dall'omonimo romanzo di Rona Jaffe (in Italia come Labirinti e Mostri).
Io l'ho letto in italiano ai tempi ed è una cavolata in stile con gli articoli della Boero sui gdr.
Ricordo che finendo di leggere dissi qualcosa tipo "Ma fottiti, Pardu-palle!" xD

Moreno Roncucci

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« Risposta #12 il: 2010-06-02 23:58:27 »
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[cite]Autore: Blerpa[/cite]Moreno, perdonami, ma sbaglio o dopo AD&D 1a edizione che era un po' un disastro a livello di regole e bilanciamento, Gygax insoddisfatto decise di produrre/scrivere/mettere la sua firma (Sembieda e Gygax, due luminari del latrocinio del lavoro altrui, lol) sul supplemento Unearthed Arcana e che, avendo questo supplemento ancora di più incasinato le regole, spinse la TSR (o Gygax, come gli piace gloriarsi) al decidere, fra polemiche e insoddisfazioni nelle varie fazioni dei fan, di sviluppare la 2a edizione di AD&D?


Ciascuno su queste cose dà la sua versione.  Ma a livello di vendite, credo che AD&D 1a edizione sia tutt'ora l'edizione più venduta di D&D, e sono più o meno tutti d'accodo le fonti nel dire che Unearthed Arcana e Oriental Adventures sono stati pubblicati in fretta e furia per salvare la TSR dalla bancarotta. Poi Gygax dice nelle sue faq che i problemi di bilanciamenti erano dovuti alla fretta con cui è uscito, vai a sapere se è vero... io non ho molta stima nelle qualità di Gygax come game designer, praticamente ogni versione contemporanea di D&D (da Holmes a Mentzer passando per Moldvay e Cook) è meglio della sua... però c'è anche da dire che al confronto di quella schifezza scarsamente playtestata della seconda edizione, AD&D ci fa un figurone, quindi magari era anche la politica aziendale dell'epoca...
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« Risposta #13 il: 2010-06-03 00:06:05 »
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[cite]Autore: Blerpa[/cite]D'altronde D&D ebbe pure un boost incredibile all'inizio degli anni '80 quando uscì quella PORCATA di film con Tom Hanks chiamato Mazes and Monsters tratto dall'omonimo romanzo di Rona Jaffe (in Italia come Labirinti e Mostri).
Io l'ho letto in italiano ai tempi ed è una cavolata in stile con gli articoli della Boero sui gdr.


Ecco l'articolo di Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mazes_and_Monsters
Da quella pagina, sarebbe un film per la TV trasmesso il 28 dicembre 1982 Quindi il suo effetto si sarebbe dovuto vedere nel 1983, dove invece si ha un rallentamento della crescita della TSR. Probabilmente ha aiutato un po', ma a quel punto l'effetto "novità" era passato...
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Mr. Mario

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« Risposta #14 il: 2010-06-03 11:46:46 »
Nell'82 esce anche E.T. Sarà stato quello. :)
Sognatore incorreggibile. Segretario dell'Agenzia degli Incantesimi. Seguace di Taku. L'uomo che sussurrava ai mirtilli.

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